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Econometric models of job exit are of interest for at least two reasons. There 
has been a significant decline in the civilian labor force participation of older 
Americans for the past twenty years (Wise 1985). During the same period, 
private pension coverage has increased markedly, and Social Security benefits 
have risen. The study of relationships between the two trends is of interest to 
economists attempting to explain the incentives that pension plans may provide 
in encouraging workers to change jobs or stop working, and is also important 
to firms who may want to affect employee retirement behavior by changing the 
provisions of their pension plans. 
In  the military, there is a slightly different perspective. The armed forces 
must maintain adequate numbers of trained and experienced personnel without 
the realistic possibility of lateral  job entry to replace losses.  A shortage of expe- 
rienced military pilots cannot be eliminated by hiring pilots from another mili- 
tary, for example. The absence of this remedy for the loss of personnel means 
that shortfalls in any cohort are difficult to correct, and the potential incentive 
effects of changes in compensation must be considered before they are made. 
Both the civilian trend and the military problem are sufficient to have en- 
couraged extensive research. The military, through research at the RAND Cor- 
poration, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the Pentagon, has been refining 
models of  military  retirement since  1975. Indeed, Baldwin  (Baldwin and 
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Daula  1985) states that the economics of  military manpower emerged as a 
branch of defense economics with the end of the draft. 
In this paper, we use the option value model of retirement behavior devel- 
oped by Stock and Wise (1990) to examine the effects of changes in compensa- 
tion on the decision of Air Force pilots to leave the military. Section 3.1 pro- 
vides background information.  We start with a brief discussion of the problem 
of pilot retention in the Air Force and the compensation  changes that have been 
suggested to solve it. Because a large part of career military compensation is 
in the form of pension benefits, we discuss the value of these benefits. In sec- 
tion 3.2, after a description of the data used in this study, we describe the option 
value model and highlight how  it differs from other models that have been 
used to study this topic. Section 3.3 presents graphical displays of  the pre- 
dictive accuracy of the option value model and compares these to the accuracy 
of  competing models. Of  particular interest is that the option value model, 
which can be viewed as a simplified dynamic programming specification,  pre- 
dicts complicated military retirement patterns much better than the dynamic 
programming formulation to which it is compared. The effects on the distribu- 
tion of the pilot population (by years of service) of selected changes in com- 
pensation are discussed in section 3.3.2. 
3.1  Background 
3.1.1  Pilot Compensation 
Military pilots have received extra pay ever since the Army Appropriation 
Act of 2 March 1913, which provided an increase of  35% in pay  and allow- 
ances for Army officers flying heavier-than-air craft. According to Bartholo- 
mew (1982, 93), the pay  was strictly to compensate pilots for the extremely 
hazardous duty they were undertaking. The Career Compensation  Act of  1949 
initiated a change in philosophy for the special pay,  saying “the incentive to 
engage and remain in  hazardous occupations provided a more realistic and 
practical basis for determining the rates of  special pay  than the theory  of 
recompense for shorter career expectancy. The recompense or replacement 
concept, although promoted for many  years as the sole argument for hazard 
pay, was found wanting for several reasons” (Bartholomew 1982,94). In other 
words, instead of trying to make their shorter lives happier because of higher 
pay, the government should pay  pilots enough to make them prefer employ- 
ment in the military to employment in civilian positions. The incentive pay 
structure adopted by the Career Compensation  Act provided extra pay that de- 
pended only on the rank of the member who was flying. 
By  1955, the services were having difficulty recruiting pilots and retaining 
younger pilots who had completed their service obligation, and the incentive 
pay system was changed so that flight pay depended not only on grade, but on 
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Another change in philosophy occurred in  1974, when Congress decided 
that flight pay should be more than compensation for actual flying duties. In- 
stead, because of the large investment made by the military in the training of 
its pilots, it was felt that extra pay should be structured so that a pilot has the 
incentive to remain in the service for a full career. The Aviation Career Incen- 
tive Pay (ACIP) Act was an effort to do this. 
As the 1980s drew to a close, it became apparent that ACIP was no longer 
sufficient to retain enough pilots to meet projected defense needs. According 
to the 17 January 1989 Report of the Secretary of Defense, the armed forces 
were losing one experienced fighter pilot per day in 1988, and this represented 
a cost of more than $2.5 million to the government (Department of Defense 
1988, 103). The DoD annual report for  1989 echoes the concern that high 
pilot losses jeopardized combat readiness of the armed forces (Department of 
Defense 1989a, 125). Assuming the low 1989 retention rates continued from 
1991 to 1994, the Air Force predicted that “shortfalls” of pilots in the groups 
with one to fourteen years of service would rise from 895 in fiscal year 1989 
to over 2,100 in 1994 (Department of Defense 1988,6-24). 
The major reason for the loss of pilots is increased hiring by  commercial 
airlines. A surge of  pilot hiring in  the  1960s, which translated into a large 
retirement rate of commercial pilots in the 1990s, has led to another surge of 
hiring. According to the Department of  Defense, 37% of  the commercial jet 
pilot force (approximately  forty-three thousand) will need to be replaced in the 
1990s (Department of Defense 1988,2-5). Despite turmoil in the airline indus- 
try because of the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990, many major airlines continued 
the aggressive hiring practices that contributed to the fact that, for the third 
year in a row, Air Force pilot losses exceeded production by  more than eight 
hundred. 
The desire of military pilots to leave the service to fly for commercial air- 
lines is understandable when potential earnings are considered. For example, 
a married Air Force pilot with eight years of service in 1989 would be earning 
slightly more than $45,000 annually, and could look forward to making over 
$61,000 per year (using 1989 pay tables) by the time he or she reached twenty 
years of service. If this same pilot left the Air Force after eight years of service 
and  landed a job with  a  major  airline, annual salary could  be  well  over 
$100,000 after ten years. (These figures are based on table 2-4 of Department 
of Defense 1988.) 
According to the Department of Defense Aviator Retention  Study, “When 
faced with the choice between an ‘average’ private sector job and a military 
flying career, the military career competes favorably with its challenging  jobs, 
security,  job satisfaction, and opportunities for travel, advanced education, and 
service to country. The evidence is overwhelming, however, that lucrative air- 
line pilot careers, when readily available, are preferred and account for the 
majority of military pilot separations” (Department of Defense 1988,2-8). 
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pilots, Congress authorized a new bonus program in 1988 called Aviator Con- 
tinuation Pay (ACP). In the Air Force, this program provides bonuses that de- 
pend on the pilot’s years of service and require that the pilot agree to serve for 
a total of  fourteen years in order to receive the money. For example, a pilot 
with six years of service can receive an annual bonus of  $12,000 by  agreeing 
to remain in the service until completing fourteen years of service; the bonus 
will not be received without incurring the obligation. The size of  the bonus 
decreases with seniority, until a pilot who has completed twelve years of ser- 
vice will be offered $6,500 per year to remain through fourteen years of service 
(Bowman  1990). In  1989, the cost  of  this program  from  fiscal year  1990 
through fiscal year 1994 was anticipated to be approximately $94 million. 
While the added compensation from ACP and ACIP is substantial, the ad- 
vantage of  remaining in the military long enough to earn retirement benefits 
(benefits that are available to pilots and nonpilots alike) must also be consid- 
ered. Compared to most civilian pension plans, the military pension is simple 
to calculate and extremely generous, although it does have the disadvantage, 
from the military member’s point of view, of having cliff vesting (with a ven- 
geance): pension benefits are not available until a person serves for twenty 
years; anyone who leaves the military before twenty years of service receives 
no pension benefits. 
3.1.2  The Military Pension 
The structure of  the military pension system has remained relatively un- 
changed since 1916, when an act of Congress (Public Law 64-241, U.S. Stut- 
Utes at Large 39 [1916]: 579) established the formula that retired pay would 
equal 2.5% of  monthly pay per year of  service up to a maximum of 75% at 
thirty years of service (Bartholomew 1982,235). Most changes since then have 
dealt with the nature of cost of living gdjustments (COLAS)  that are part of the 
pension, what type of pay is used for the calculation of the benefit, and when 
retirement is authorized. Probably the most complicated aspect of the pension 
now is the fact that, depending on when individuals entered the service, they 
may be covered by one of three different plans. Table 3.1 describes the differ- 
ences among them, and which military members are affected by  them. Using 
1988 pay tables, a typical lieutenant colonel retiring after twenty years of ser- 
vice would have an annual pension of  approximately $22,152 under the first 
plan, $21,000 under the second, and $17,000 under the third. The DoD esti- 
mates that the present values of the pension benefits at the time of retirement 
would be $595,000, $553,000, and $445,000, respectively. 
3.2  The Data and Models 
3.2.1  The Sample 
The Air Force maintains the Longitudinal Cohort File, a file of information 
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Table 3.1  Characteristics  of Current Retirement System 
Date of Entry  Calculation of Benefit  Cost of Living Adjustment 
Before 8 Sept. 1980 
Between 8 Sept. 1980 
and 1 Aug. 1986 
After  1 Aug. 1986 
After 20 years of service, 50% of 
final basic pay. Benefit increases 
2.5%  for  each  additional year 
served, up to 75%. 
After 20 years of service, 50% of 
the average basic pay of the 
highest 3 earnings years. Benefit 
increases 2.5% for each addi- 
tional year served, up to 75%. 
After 20 years of service, 40% of 
the average basic pay of the 
highest 3 earnings years. Benefit 
increases 3.5% for each addi- 
tional year served, up to 75%. 
Annual COLA to match inflation. 
Annual COLA to match inflation. 
Annual COLA 1  % below con- 
sumer price index (CPI) until age 
62. At age 62, pension is recal- 
culated to be what it would have 
been if entry was before 8 Sept. 
1980. After age 62, annual COLA 
is again I % below CPI. 
Source: Information is from Air Force Regulation 35-7, chap. 7. 
from 1974 to 1991. From this file, the Air Force Military Personnel Center 
(AFMPC) produced a random sample of five thousand male pilots who in 1987 
had completed between six and twenty-seven years of commissioned service. 
Individuals who had served as enlisted personnel before being commissioned 
as officers were excluded from the sample, because historically, departure pat- 
terns for those with prior service have been different from those of  officers 
without prior service. 
Officers in the file are recorded as being present or not present in the Air 
Force when the file is updated annually. We  have no record of actual employ- 
ment after leaving the Air Force, but we assume that departures are voluntary 
and that the decision to leave is made based on a comparison of future compen- 
sation from the military to potential compensation from a civilian airline posi- 
tion. The file lists the Air Force Command to which the pilot belongs, and the 
model parameter estimates in this paper are based on the 1,803 officers who 
were  in  the  Strategic Air  Command  (SAC) or  Military Airlift  Command 
(MAC). Pilots in these two commands had fairly similar departure rates from 
1987 to 1989, and the “heavy” aircraft flown in these commands require skills 
similar to those needed in civilian airline positions. For the purposes of calcu- 
lating income, the first full year of civilian pay or pension receipt was consid- 
ered to be the year after an individual was recorded as not present. For ex- 
ample, a pilot present in 1987 but absent in 1988 receives the first full year of 
civilian pay (and pension benefits, if entitled to them) in 1989. 
3.2.2  The Option Value Model 
Following Stock and Wise (1990), in any given year s, an Air Force pilot 
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military, a salary C, in a new civilian job plus any retirement benefits BS  that 
have been earned as a result of  military service. If  we say that the individ- 
ual indirectly derives utility U,(s) from military income in year s and utility 
U&)  from civilian employment  plus military pension benefits, we can develop 
an expression for the utility of working until different times in the future. Sup- 
pose that no one lives beyond year T,  that individuals discount future earnings 
by  a factor p, and that r is the first year in  which civilian earnings and/or 
retirement benefits are received. For an individual in year t considering being 
out of the Air Force in year r, the value of that decision is 
(1) 
r- 1  T 
V,(r)  = cp.-q.f(d  + CP”-‘Uc(s), 
S=I  5=1 
that is, the discounted sum of the utility of working in the Air Force from now 
until year r -  1 plus the discounted sum of the utility of working elsewhere 
and receiving pension benefits (if any) from year r until death. 
Similarly, the value of leaving the Air Force now, in year t, is 
T 
V,(t) = cp”-‘U,(S). 
$=I 
The expected gain in utility from delaying departure until year r is given by 
(3)  G,(r)  = E,V,(r) -  E,V,(t). 
It will be to the person’s advantage to delay the decision to leave the military 
until year r if the expected gain in utility is greater than zero. We  will assume 
that an individual will leave the Air Force if, when considering all future depar- 
ture dates, the maximum gain possible is less than or equal to zero, that is, if 
G,(r*)  d  0, where r* is the potential departure year with the maximum gain. 
Assume that an individual’s  utility has a constant relative risk aversion form. 
(4)  U,(s) = Y; + os and  U,(s) = (C,(r)  + kBs(r))Y + CS 
The potential civilian income C,(r)  may, and the retirement benefits Bs(r)  will, 
depend on the year r that the individual is first in a civilian position, and so 
they are shown as functions of the departure year. Additionally, the coefficient 
k is introduced to account for the possibility that a person may value military 
pension earnings differently than earnings that require labor. The error terms 
are meant to capture unobserved determinants of departure. For example, they 
could reflect individual preferences for work versus leisure. They could also 
account for differing tastes for military life, variable tax filing status that will 
change the effect of nontaxable portions of military income, differing assess- 
ments of potential for military advancement, and variable unobserved wealth. 
For a given individual in the military, there should be considerable persistence 
in these random effects over time, and so the error terms are assumed to follow 
a first-order Markov process. 
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5, = PS,-,  + ces  E,-I(EJ  = 0 
At time t, the individual knows both w and E, but not the values that evolve 
over time. With these specifications, the expected gain from postponing depar- 
ture until year r can be written 
T 
-  CP"-'E,[(Cs(t)  + kB$))Y  + 61 
$=I 
(6) 
=g,(r) + +,@I. 
The function +  contains the random effects, and the function g contains the 
rest. We must also take into account the likelihood that an individual will sur- 
vive to receive the earnings anticipated. If we let a(s I t)  represent the probabil- 
ity that a person will be alive in year s  given he or she is alive in year t, and 
assume this probability is independent of the individual error effects, the func- 
tions g,(r)  and +,(r)  become 
S=f 
and 
I-  I 
+,(r)  = CPs-'a(s  I  t)Er(ws -  5,). 
s=r 
Under the Markov assumption for the individual specific errors, the expecta- 
tion at time t can be written E,(w,) = ps-'w, and E,(c,) = p"-'[,,  and so the 
function 4 takes the form 
(8) 
where 
I-  I 
+,(r) = Cp"-'a(s  I  t)Ps-'(W,  -  5,) = K(r)u,, 
I=f 
r-  I 
K,(r) = CpS-'a(s I t)p"-'  and  u, = o,  -  5,. 
s=t 
The term K,(r)  cumulates the deflators that yield the present value in year t of 
the future expected values of the random components of  utility. The further r 
is in the future, the larger is Kt(r).  That is, the more distant the potential retire- 
ment age, the greater the uncertainty about it, yielding a heteroskedastic distur- 
bance term. Finally, then, the expected gain in year t from postponing departure 
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(9)  = g,(r)  + Wb,. 
If we let R be a random variable representing  the year of departure, the prob- 
ability that an individual will be gone in year t is given by 
Pr[R = t] = Pr[G,(r)  5 01 
(10)  = Pr[g,(r)  + K,(r)v,  5  01 
= pr[%]  5  -vr  rc[t + 1,.  . . ,  TI 
where r*  is the future year that gives 
maining in the Air Force.’ 
3.2.3  Other Models 
--~,, 
the largest value for the gain from re- 
An alternative model has been used by the military for some time to study 
retirement behavior, and we compare the predictive validity of that model with 
the option value model discussed above. It is also of interest to consider how 
the option value model compares with a more complex stochastic dynamic 
programming model. Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992) have done this for 
civilian employees. The cumulating evidence from their work suggests that the 
more economically accurate stochastic dynamic programming model does no 
better than the simpler option value model at approximating the actual deci- 
sions of employees. The military pension structure offers a particularly good 
test of the predictive validity of these models, and we present such compari- 
sons in this paper. We describe a popular DoD model and a dynamic program- 
ming model. 
The Annualized Cost of  Leaving Model 
The annualized cost of  leaving (ACOL) model was developed by  John T. 
Warner (1979) and was the analytical basis for the Fijih Quadrennial Review 
ofMiEitary Compensation’s study of  changes in the military pension system 
(Department of Defense 1984). It is used frequently enough by the Air Force 
Personnel Analysis Center to have been incorporated in an interactive com- 
puter program called the Compensation Model for determining the effects of 
various changes in compensation policies (Norris 1987). The Department of 
Defense  Aviator Retention Study (1988) and the Congressional Budget Office 
(1989) also relied on the model, either directly or indirectly, to predict the 
effects of the 1989 pilot bonus program. 
1. The analysis presented in this paper is based on retirement decisions in a single year. Stock 
and Wise (1590) describe an extension of  the model to accommodate  repeated observation for the 
same person over time. Estimates based on more than one consecutive  year are  presented in Ausink 
(1  99 1). and the results are virtually the same as those presented here. 91  Pension, Compensation, and Retirement of US.  Air Force Pilots 
The description here is intended to bring out the relationship between the 
ACOL and the option value models. Assume that individuals are risk neutral 
(y = l),  that military compensation and pension benefits are valued the same 
(the k in the option value model is one), and that individuals have unobserved 
random taste r for military employment. In year s, the utilities associated with 
Air Force work and with civilian employment are then 
(11)  U,(s) = Y, + r  and  U&)  = CJr)  + B3(r). 
In year t,  the expected value of beginning civilian employment in year r is 
(12)  vr(r>  = zp~-rn(s  I t)(Y, + r)  + $p”-,n(s  I t)(C,(r)  + ~~(r)), 
and the value of leaving the Air Force for a new job now is 
(13) 
s=r  s=r 
7 
v,w = CpS-‘~TT(S  I t>(C,(t)  + Bm. 
s=r 
In year t, the cost of  leaving instead of remaining until year r, COLr(r),  is 
the benefit forgone by making the decision to leave in year t, 
COL,(r)  =Vr(r) -  Vr(r) 
This description has the same form as equation 9, G,(r)  = g,(r> + K,(r)v,, 
in the option value model, with the random taste term replacing the Markov 
error structure. 
A person retires if, when considering all future departure dates, the maxi- 
mum of 
(15) 
-1  r-I 
ACOLr(r)  = [<p-,n(s  I t)] [  CpS-r~(s  I  t)Y, 
?=I  s=r 
+ zps-rn(s  I t)(C,T(r)  + B,(r))]  + r 
s=r 
is less than zero,* or if ACOL,(r*) = gr(r*)/Kr(r*)  + 
value definitions (equation 10). 
< 0, using the option 
In practice, the model is estimated using the logit formulation 
(16) 
with ACOL* calculated based on an assumed discount rate.3 
y = a. + a,  ACOL* + E 
2. This term is also equal to the annualized cost of leaving, which gives rise to the model name. 
3. This is similar to a probit specification used in Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992), compar- 
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A Stochastic Dynamic Programming Spec$cation 
We  use the stochastic dynamic programming specification used by  Lums- 
daine, Stock, and Wise (1992), which is a variant of the model proposed by 
Daula and Moffitt (1989) to study Army enlisted behavior, which is in turn a 
variant of the Gotz and McCall(l984) dynamic programming model of reten- 
tion behavior for Air Force officers. When estimating retirement in one period, 
the Gotz-McCall model is the same as the Daula-Moffitt model. 
The main conceptual difference between the option value model and the 
dynamic programming approach is that in the option value model an individual 
compares the utility of leaving the military now with the maximum value of 
expected future utilities. In the dynamic programming models, the decision is 
based on the expected value of the maximum of current versus future options. 
An example will help clarify the difference. 
For Air Force officers, retirement is mandatory (with few exceptions) after 
thirty years of  service. After the twenty-ninth year of  service, the separation 
decision is thus based on comparing the utility of leaving with the utility of 
serving one more year and retiring after thirty years of service. At this point, 
the decision rule for the option value model and the dynamic retention model 
are the same: the option value model decision maker compares the expected 
value of retiring with the expected value of working one more year and then 
retiring, and makes the choice with the maximum value. The dynamic decision 
maker does the same thing, and we will call the value of this decision Wz9. 
After twenty-eight years of service, the decision rules are different. The op- 
tion value decision maker compares the expected values of  separating after 
twenty-eight, twenty-nine, and thirty years of service, and makes the decision 
based on the maximum of these. The dynamic programming rule has the deci- 
sion maker comparing the value of leaving after twenty-eight years of service 
with the value of serving one more year and then making decision Wz9. Since 
in year twenty-eight the actual circumstances of the twenty-ninth year are not 
known, the decision is based on the expected value of  WZ9,  which is the maxi- 
mum of two random variables. For any year t <  28, an individual can in theory 
calculate recursively the value of remaining in the service and receiving W,,, 
from future “correct” decisions. 
Again, analogous to the option value specification,  assume that an individu- 
al’s utility from Air Force employment in year s is 
and utility from leaving for a new job is 
The term r is a random additive taste for military employment, and is as- 
sumed to be distributed as N(0,  A2).  If A = 0, as we will assume in this paper, 93  Pension, Compensation, and Retirement of U.S.  Air Force Pilots 
there is no random taste factor. The disturbance terms are random perturba- 
tions to the utilities in a given year of service, and are assumed to be known 
to the individual at time t. Unlike the option value errors, these are assumed 
to be independent over time. The estimation procedure is described in the ap- 
pendix. 
3.3  Results 
3.3.1  Parameter Estimates and Comparisons 
Table 3.2 shows the utility function parameters obtained for the three models 
of retirement behavior. An easy way to compare the results of the three models 
is to graph the actual and predicted voluntary loss rates for the pilot population 
under con~ideration.~ 
Figure 3.la shows the actual and option value predicted 1988 voluntary loss 
rates of pilots in the sample. Figure 3.lb shows the implied cumulative volun- 
tary loss rates. Both panels include a 95% confidence interval around the ac- 
tual rates. 
The option value model predictions fall outside the 95% confidence interval 
only at seven, eight, nine, and twenty-three years of service. The model under- 
estimates the departure rates at seven and eight years of service; pilots in these 
years are just completing their initial service obligations for pilot training, and 
many may be leaving because they realize that military flying is not to their 
liking. A difference in the characteristics of the pilot population still within a 
year or two of completion of the initial service obligation and the population 
that remains after the initial obligation would help explain the inability of the 
model to pick up the large initial departures. 
Promotion to the rank of major occurs sometime after the eleven-year point 
in an officer’s career. Those who accept promotion are obligated to remain in 
the service for two more years; those who refuse promotion will leave, and 
those who do not receive the promotion may decide to leave rather than try for 
promotion at a later date. The jump in actual departures at the twelve-year 
point seems to be a result of those who are leaving after not accepting (or not 
receiving) the promotion to major. The model may not pick up this increase 
because the decision made here involves nonpecuniary factors such as lack of 
desire to be committed beyond twelve years of service. 
It is striking that the model captures rather well the wide jumps in departure 
rates between twenty and twenty-eight years of service. 
By  way  of  comparison, figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the predicted voluntary 
loss rates using the dynamic programming and ACOL models. Although the 
dynamic programming formulation matches the data about as well as the op- 
4. The voluntary loss rate in year t is the percentage of pilots without any service obligation in 
year I who are not present in year I + 1. 94  John Ausink and David A. Wise 
Table 3.2  Parameter Estimate Summary 
Dynamic Programming 
Option Value Model  Model 



















































501.1  529.9 
52.1  70.0 
Notes: Estimation is by  maximum likelihood. Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard 
errors. Monetary values are in $100,OOO (1986 dollars). 
”Parameter  fixed. 
bNote that u  for option value model and dynamic programming model are not comparable. 
‘For the above table, the x2  goodness-of-fit statistic is calculated as 
x2  =  If  ~,  (To, -  rP,)’ 
,=7  rP, 
where ra, is the actual departure rate for those with j years of service, r,is the predicted departure 
rate for those with j years of  service, and n,  is the number of individuals who have completed j 
years of service. 
tion value for persons with less than twenty years of service, it underpredicts 
the large increase in departures at twenty years, and is much less successful at 
following retirement patterns after twenty years of service. The ACOL model 
substantially overpredicts loss rates in the early years of service, does not pick 
up the large increase in departures after twenty years of service, and does not 
follow at all the pattern of  changes in departure rates after twenty years of 
service. 
We  have two “out-of-sample’’ tests of  the predictive power of  the models 
investigated here. The first uses the parameters for the MAC and SAC pilots 
to predict the loss rates for Tactical  Airlift Command (TAC) pilots in the initial 
sample; the second uses the 1988 parameters to predict 1989 SAC and MAC 
loss rates after the introduction of ACP. 
Figure 3.4a compares the actual voluntary loss rates of TAC pilots in 1988 
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Fig. 3.1  Actual and predicted 1988 voluntary loss rates, option value model 
models. Figure 3.4b compares the predictions of the option value and ACOL 
models. As with the in-sample comparisons, the option value and dynamic 
programming models yield very similar predictions before twenty years of ser- 
vice, but after twenty years of  service the option value model follows the actual 
departure pattern much better than does the dynamic programming model. The 
ACOL model predictions are much worse than the other two. 
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 compare the predicted 1989 departure rates using 1988 96  John Ausink and David A. Wise 
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Fig. 3.2  Actual and predicted 1988 voluntary loss rates, dynamic 
programming model 
parameter estimates. The top graph in  each figure shows the option value 
model predictions (both with  and  without the introduction of  the bonus). 
Again, the option value and dynamic programming models are very  similar 
until the twenty-year point, after which the option value predictions are much 
closer to the actual departure rates. The ACOL predictions are the farthest from 
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Fig. 3.3  Actual and predicted 1988 voluntary loss rates, ACOL model 
in departure rates as a result of the bonus payments than does either the option 
value or the dynamic programming rnodeL5 
5.  The introduction of ACP did not produce the desired reduction in pilot losses. The Air Force 
view is that those who accepted the bonus were planning to remain in the service anyway. How- 
ever, the bonus is not viewed as a failure. Those who accept the bonus incur a service commitment, 
and so Air Force personnel planners know which pilots will not be able to leave the military in 
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Fig. 3.4  TAC voluntary loss rate comparisons: a, option value and dynamic 
programming models; b, option value and ACOL models 
The importance of  the improved predictive capability of  the option value 
model from a policy perspective is apparent in figure 3.7. The figure compares 
the potential effects of the 1986 change in the military pension predicted by 
the option value model to those predicted by the ACOL model.6 Numbers be- 
6. This was done by  assuming that the relative changes in departure patterns caused by  the 
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Fig. 3.5 
pilot bonus: a, option value model; b, dynamic programming model 
Predicted 1989 departures with 1988 parameters, with and without the 
low the zero reference line mean that pilots will leave because of the change; 
numbers above it mean that more will stay. For example, at twelve years of 
service, the option value model predicts that almost one hundred pilots will 
~ 
entire pilot population. The simulation assumes that pilots present in 1987 are suddenly faced with 
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Fig. 3.6  Predicted 1989 departures with 1988 parameters, with and without the 
pilot bonus: a, option value model; b, ACOL model 
leave because of  the new pension plan, while the ACOL model predicts that 
only ten will leave. What is most important here is that the changes in pension 
benefits may affect officers at an earlier stage in their career than previously 
expected. The ACOL model shows very little effect until after twelve years of 
service; the option value model shows large effects as early as seven years of 
service. Using 1987 pilot populations, the option value model shows the Air 
Force losing 7 14 pilots in the seven-to-nineteen-years-of-service  cohorts under 101  Pension, Compensation, and Retirement of U.S. Air Force Pilots 
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Fig. 3.7  Potential effect of pension change, using total 1987 pilot population 
the new system, while the ACOL model shows a loss of only 229. The possibil- 
ity of the pension change having larger effects on younger military members 
was raised by Arguden (1987), using the Gotz-McCall dynamic programming 
model with the Air Force enlisted population. 
3.3.2  Potential Changes in Pilot Distribution 
Using factors such as the expected number of  aircraft available in future 
years and the number of crews required to fill them, the DoD and the Air Force 
develop an “objective force” as part of the five-year defense plan to show the 
desired distribution of pilots by years of service. Decisions concerning changes 
in the management of the pilot force are made with the objective force struc- 
ture in mind. 
Figure 3.8 shows the 1994 objective force (taken from the Department of 
Defense Aviator Retention Study), the actual distribution of pilots by years of 
service in  1990, and the distribution of  pilots if  the departure rates of  1990 
continued for the next four years. The figure assumes that sixteen hundred 
pilots complete pilot training each year. Compared to the objective force, cur- 
rent pilot levels are low in all years except five, six, seven, and the years after 
fifteen. With the 1990 departure rates, the shortages will increase in all years 
from six through nineteen, and, of  course, this is the problem that the pilot 
bonus was meant to solve. 
We  noted in section 3.3.1 that the implementation of ACP did not have the 
desired effect on pilot retention rates. We  have attempted to devise a bonus 102  John Ausink and David A. Wise 
Fig. 3.8  Population in 1990 and 1994, assuming 1990 departure rates 
that would induce the departure rates necessary to maintain the 1994 objec- 
tive force. 
We do this by noting the percentage decrease in 1990 departure rates neces- 
sary to reach the 1994 steady-state rates and determining the bonus necessary 
to achieve this decrease of departure rates in the 1988 sample of MAC and 
SAC pilots.’ 
The result of this exercise is shown in figure 3.9. The best fit using a new 
bonus amount requires that current bonuses be increased sixfold-that  is, for 
a pilot who has completed six years of service, the annual bonus for the next 
eight years needs to be $72,000 instead of $12,000! The population changes 
over the five-year period from 1990 to 1994 lead to the distribution in the fig- 
ure. The pilot shortages from seven years of service to twelve years of service 
are largely reduced (overcome more than we want in nine, ten, and eleven), 
but shortages continue from thirteen years on. This would obviously be an 
extremely expensive program. 
If  we assume that the pension plan change that affects military members 
who entered the service after August 1986 were suddenly applicable to pilots 
present in 1990, the long-term effects of the decrease in pension compensation 
result in the distribution of figure 3.10. Pilot shortages increase from eight 
years of service through nineteen years of service, then surpluses exist through 
twenty-seven years of service. 
7. We assume that the new bonuses are a constant multiple k of the current bonuses available. 
The k that produces the best fit (in a least squares sense) to the desired departure rates gives us the 
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Fig. 3.9  Population in 1990 and 1994: 1990 departures versus increased bonus. 
Base total = 18,911; new total = 21,552. 
Fig. 3.10 
pension rates 
Population in 1990 and 1994: 1990 departures versus new 104  John Ausink and David A. Wise 
3.4  Conclusions 
The option value model captures Air Force pilot departure behavior much 
better than the ACOL model that has been used by the military, and substan- 
tially better than a more complex stochastic dynamic programming specifica- 
tion. The superiority of the option value model to the dynamic programming 
formulation raises the possibility that individual decision making may not al- 
ways be best modeled with a model that is intended to approximate “correct” 
economic financial calculations. This is consistent with the results of Lums- 
daine, Stock, and Wise (1992). 
Predictions of the effects of changes in compensation using the option value 
model indicate that individuals at early stages in their careers are more sensi- 
tive to losses of future benefits than indicated by previous models. The effects 
of  temporary annual bonuses such as ACP are small-and  bonus amounts 
must be extremely large to induce departure rates that come close to achieving 
the 1994 objective force. 
The extraordinary changes in the world’s political and military climate since 
the summer of  1991 will lead to adjustments in the defense structure of  the 
United States. Already, decreases in the defense budget have led to a drop in 
the planned number of Air Force tactical fighter wings and a 25% decrease in 
the number of  cockpits available for pilots. Entries into undergraduate pilot 
training will be reduced by  270 pilots per year starting in 1992, and the total 
number of pilots in the Air Force is expected to be down from over 21,000 in 
1990 to 16,500 in 1997.8 
Overall Air Force strength is projected to decrease markedly in the next few 
years-from  545,000 personnel in 1990 to approximately 415,000 by  1995. 
To encourage people to leave the service, the Air Force instituted two incentive 
programs in 1992. The first, called the Voluntary Separation Incentive (VSI), 
provides an annual payment to an individual (payment based on base pay and 
number of  years of  service) that will last for twice the number of  years the 
individual has been in the service. For example, a major with sixteen years of 
service could leave the Air Force and receive an annual payment of  $17,466 
for thirty-two years (a present value of $236,343, according to the Air Force). 
The second, called the Special Separation Benefit (SSB), is a lump-sum 
payment that is 15% of  an individual’s base pay multiplied by the number of 
years served. The major mentioned above would receive a one time SSB pay- 
ment of $104,795. 
Both programs were introduced with little econometric modeling of  their 
potential effects, and fewer officers than expected applied to accept either 
program. 
As the Air Force and the other services struggle to reduce in size, other 
8. These figures for pilot reductions were reported in the 15 July 1991 Air Force 7imes. 105  Pension, Compensation, and Retirement of U.S. Air Force Pilots 
separation incentives will be proposed and studied. The procedure discussed 
here may be useful in predicting their effects. 
3.5  Postscript: VSYSSB Results 
The present value of the SSB is significantly less than the present value of 
the VSI. Nonetheless, initial applications to leave the Air Force under either 
program showed a large preference for the lump-sum payment. By June 1992, 
of the 4,870 officers who accepted one of the programs, a small majority chose 
the annuity (2,366 accepted the lump sum); of 24,807 enlisted personnel who 
accepted one of the programs, the vast majority-22,140-chose  the lump- 
sum payment. 
Acceptance rates varied with age and rank. All enlisted ranks preferred the 
lump-sum payment. On the officer side, first lieutenants preferred the VSI to 
the SSB by a slight margin (51.7% to 48.3%), captains preferred the SSB by  a 
slight margin (51% to 49%), and majors preferred the VSI 68.6% to 31.4%.9 
In an exit survey conducted by  the AFMPC, reasons given for selecting the 
lump sum over the annuity included “quick money” and “investment.” Reasons 
for preferring the annuity included “greater value” and “long-term income.” 
On a more sour note, 95 of 900 written comments received in the survey ad- 
dressed lack of trust in the government to follow through on the annuity pay- 
ments as a reason to accept the lump sum instead.’O 
The unexpected pattern of  benefit acceptance raises questions about how 
individuals treat lump-sum payments as opposed to annuities. It is no surprise 
that the option value model shows that the pilot population should prefer the 
VSI program to the SSB because of the former’s higher present value; however, 
one experiment with the option value model showed an interesting result. 
In figure 3.11, the “Base, few hires” line shows hazard rates predicted by 
the option value model if the probability of being hired by an airline gradually 
decreases as an individual gets older and neither VSI nor SSB is offered. The 
VS16 line in the figure (which we could call the predictions for the “pessimis- 
tic” pilots) shows the predicted hazard rates for pilots who believe that airline 
hiring will decline and would treat VSI as a retirement benefit; that is, the 
benefit is multiplied by the k parameter in the model. 
On the other hand, if we assume that the probability of being hired by  an 
airline after leaving the Air Force remains certain and also assume that an SSB 
lump-sum payment is treated as ordinary income (that is, it is not multiplied 
by  the k parameter in the model), the predicted hazard rates are as shown by 
the SSB8 line (the “optimistic” pilots). 
9. These figures come from information provided by Major Jerry Ludke, of the AFMPCDPYO 
10. The survey was conducted by the Analysis Division, Directorate of Personnel Operations, 
at Randolph Air Force Base. 
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Fig. 3.11  Postscript simulations 
The lines cross at about ten years of service. A very loose interpretation of 
this result could be that before ten years of  service pilots are optimistic about 
getting an airline position and prefer the SSB income; after ten years of service 
pilots are less optimistic about an airline job and treat the VSI as an early 
pension. 
In actuality, the pilot population did prefer the SSB to the VSI before about 
ten years of service, and the VSI afterward. However, the population involved 
is very small (482 pilots were eligible for either program, only 370 applied, and 
3  13 of these were in the eleven-to-sixteen-year  cohorts), and it is premature to 
read too much into the result of this experiment. Nonetheless, it is intriguing 
that the model hints at what should be obvious: individuals consider a variety 
of issues besides the present value of a benefit when making a decision about 
leaving employment. 
Appendix 
Stochastic Dynamic-Programming Model 
In year t, the individual makes the decision to stay or leave based on the value 
function W,  given by 107  Pension, Compensation, and Retirement of U.S. Air Force Pilots 
where p is the discount factor and T is the time of death. The first expected 
value in the brackets is that of remaining in the service one more year and then 
making the best decision in year t + 1; the second term is the expected value 
of leaving now. 
Since  the  disturbances  are  independently  and  identically  distributed, 
EpLf+.?  = 0 for s >  0. With this fact, and again taking into account the probabil- 
ity of surviving to year s  given a person is alive in year t, we can write 




An individual will decide to leave the military if 
T 
w  2,  = CpS-'7T(s  1 t)(C,(t)  + kBS(t))Y. 
I=f 
and so the probability of leaving in year t is 
If we assume that the .sir  are independent draws from a normal distribution with 
zero mean and variance u2,  the variance of (E~,  -  E~,)  is 2u2,  and we can write 
equation A6 as 
where  @  is the  cumulative normal distribution function and a, = (Wl, - 
To find this probability, we need to get an expression for the recursive part 
W;,)/@u. 
of the function W,, that is, E,-]  W,. This can be shown to be 
where + is the standard normal density function. 
In equation A8, @(a,)  represents the probability that the individual leaves 
the military and receives utility Wi,, and (1 -  @(a,))  represents the probability 
that the decision is made to remain and receive utility W;,.  The remaining term 
comes from the expectation of the disturbances. In sum, we use equation A8 108  John Ausink and David A. Wise 
to recursively calculate the values of Wl; and Wi,,  and then use equation  A7 to 
calculate the probability of retirement.” 
The error  structures of the option value  and dynamic programming ap- 
proaches are similar,  but arise from different assumptions. In both cases, future 
errors are normally distributed with nonzero covariance. This is the result of 
the Markov assumption for the generation of the  errors in the option value 
model, but comes from a “components of variance structure, with an individual 
specific effect” (Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise 1992, 14) in the dynamic pro- 
gramming model. 
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Comment on Chapters 2 and 3  Robert J. Willis 
The two papers that I am to discuss represent significant new applications of 
theories of optimal retirement, including dynamic programming models and 
the option value model developed by  Stock and Wise (1990), to real world 
problems. The application by Ausink and Wise (AW) to decisions by pilots to 
leave the Air Force appears to be a nearly unqualified success, while the paper 
by Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (LSW) attempts, without success, to eliminate 
a small but interesting blemish on their otherwise excellent track record in 
predicting retirement behavior using forward-looking optimal models. 
Since it is difficult to quarrel with success, I will postpone that task and turn 
first to a discussion of the LSW paper, which attempts to explain the spike in 
the retirement hazard at age 65. The paper’s title describes its focus on an 
interesting empirical puzzle that was noted but remained unexplained in Lums- 
daine, Stock, and Wise (1992), a previous paper in this conference series. As a 
discussant, it is heartening to note that at least one idea from comments on 
their paper concerning the effect of continuation of employer health benefits 
after retirement (Schieber 1992) received serious attention in this year’s paper. 
But it is both surprising and chastening to discover that this good suggestion 
has no merit: the current LSW paper shows that the presence or absence of 
such benefits has absolutely no effect on retirement decisions at any age. I was 
also surprised that marital status had so little effect and that retirement patterns 
for men and women are so similar. 
After finding that other possible explanations, at best, go only partway to- 
ward explaining the age-65 spike, the tentative explanation advanced by  the 
authors is that retirement at age 65 is a norm that remains normative because, 
according to their calculations, adherence to the norm has a low opportunity 
cost (for most people) relative to the optimal age calculated from a dynamic 
program. Given that the continual reoptimization needed to calculate optimal 
Robert J. Willis is professor of economics at the University of Michigan. 110  Comment on  Chapters 2 and 3 
retirement is difficult and, perhaps, anxiety-inducing, the authors argue that 
adoption of a simple rule of thumb to retire at age 65 is understandable. 
Before discussing my  reactions to the theoretical issues embedded in this 
explanation, I first wish to express a little skepticism about the claim that the 
spike in the retirement hazard at age 65 represents a norm, at least in the sense 
that the term “norm” can be equated with the term “normal age of retirement,” 
First, to complement the figures presented in the paper that plot the retirement 
hazards for data from three firms, in figure 3C.1 I plot the hazards for males 
from the three national samples that are reported in the final three columns of 
table 2.2 in LSW. These hazards are nearly identical to one another and are 
similar in shape to the empirical hazard functions for individual firms, which 
are displayed in figures 2.1-2.3  of LSW. In particular, they each show a spike 
at age 65. However, the spike at age 65 is followed by quite elevated hazards 
at ages after 65, possibly suggesting that it is retirement at age 65 or over that 
is normative.’ 
I also used the data in table 2.2 to calculate cumulative hazard functions for 
all six samples, which are plotted in figure 3C.2.  The functions from the NMES 
data and from the two SIPP samples lie between the plot for Firm 2, which 
shows a pattern of relatively delayed retirement, and the plots for Firms 1 and 
3, in which retirement is relatively accelerated. I  note in  passing that it is 
slightly misleading for LSW to emphasize the similarities in the shapes of the 
hazard functions in the three firms without pointing out how different Firm 2 
is in the pattern of cumulative retirement. Focusing on the national samples, 
we see that about 50% of retirements occur before age 65, with 20%  occurring 
before age 62 and 30% between ages 62 and 64. Moreover, almost one-third 
of  the retirements occurring at age 65 or later take place after age 65. Put 
simply, my  skepticism about viewing retirement at age 65 as a norm is based 
on evidence that only a small minority of retirements take place at age 65. 
To  be persuasive, I believe that the empirical argument presented in the pa- 
per in favor of viewing the choice of retirement at age 65 as a rule of thumb 
needs to be generalized to consider the opportunity cost of an arbitrary deci- 
sion to retire at any given age before or after age 65 relative to the benefits of 
choosing an “optimal age.” Apart from windows and special early retirement 
features, I would guess that the data for another age such as 64 or 66 would 
look much like the data presented in table 2.7. If so, the argument for regarding 
the peak at age 65 as a norm does not seem compelling. A rule of thumb that 
selected another age would be just as attractive. The argument that age 65 is 
special seems to appeal to an idea of what was typical behavior two or three 
decades ago but which is now quite atypical. 
1. A possible caveat, however, is that  the hazard  rates at  older ages may  be biased upward 
because the samples are restricted to persons of  at  least age 70 who declared themselves to be 
retired at the time of  interview. Unless the samples are concentrated at the lower end of this age 
limit, this bias seems unlikely to  be very large. 111  Comment on Chapters 2 and 3 
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Even if it is not a fully satisfactory way  of explaining the age-65 peak, the 
rule-of-thumb argument may still be useful. As I understand it, LSW argue that 
those components of an individual’s retirement resources that are outside the 
control of  a firm’s personnel policies (e.g., Social Security wealth, defined- 
contribution pensions, personal assets) do not provide strong incentives to re- 
tire at a particular age. Given this lack of  incentive, workers may  enjoy the 
luxury of choosing an age to retire with certainty and without complex calcula- 
tion, thereby improving their capacity to make unmodeled decisions, such as 
the purchase of  a retirement home in  Sun City. On the other hand, if  firms 
attempt to manipulate pension provisions in an attempt to keep or get rid of 
workers of a given age, we may infer from the predictive success of the option 
value and dynamic programming models that workers are capable of rational 
decision making of at least moderate complexity.  To the extent that the oppor- 
tunity costs of varying the age of employment are small, at least in the vicinity 
of age 65, it may be possible for employers to generate considerable alterations 
in behavior at quite modest cost. I hope that this possibility is kept from my 
employer, which has responded to the elimination of mandatory retirement for 
professors as of  1 January 1994 with a plan to pay a bonus of twice their aca- 
demic salary to professors who agree to retire at age 65. Unfortunately, choices 
made by  my  senior colleagues may reveal the secret before I am eligible to 
collect my windfall. 
Let me now turn to the AW  paper on Air Force pilots. This is a wonderful 
application of the option valuddynamic programming methodology to a very 
important problem that acquired vastly greater importance with the end of the 
Cold War. The predictive success of these models is extremely impressive, and 
the demonstration of their superiority over the DoD’s existing ACOL model is 
persuasive, although I would like to see some added discussion of what fea- 
tures of the option value and dynamic programming (OVDP) models are re- 
sponsible for this superiority. I suspect that the success of  these models will 
lead to the replacement of the ACOL model with OVDP  models to design and 
evaluate military manpower policies for dealing with the dynamics of downsiz- 
ing the military. Pictures such as those in figure 3.9 of the paper are, therefore, 
of more than academic interest. 
My only serious reservation about the paper, and about the application of 
these models to policy, concerns the use of data on civilian opportunities.  After 
pointing out that military pilots almost always leave to become pilots in civilian 
airlines, the paper is completely silent about what assumptions are made about 
employment conditions in the civilian sector. The reader should be told more 
about the data and/or assumptions about the civilian sector that underlie the 
estimates presented in the paper. More important, it seems likely that the cur- 
rent negative trends in the market for civilian airline pilots may have a very 
substantial effect on decisions by pilots to leave the Air Force and that predic- 
tions of rates of departure based on the booming market for pilots during the 
1980s may be far off the mark in designing policies for the 1990s. It would 113  Comment on Chapters 2 and 3 
be useful to add some discussion and, if  possible, develop some quantitative 
measures of the sensitivity of model predictions to variations in civilian labor 
market conditions. Given the high cost of training pilots and the correspond- 
ingly high value of making good decisions about manpower decisions in this 
area, I would think that the Air Force might consider investing in the acquisi- 
tion of some postretirement data on its pilots, at least by  using their Social 
Security earnings histories. 
My  final comments concern  issues of  interpretation of  these  forward- 
looking models of retirement behavior and suggestions for directions for fur- 
ther research. Ostensibly, estimates of  these models tell us about behavioral 
parameters that measure the value of leisure, the degree of risk aversion, and 
the rate of time discount. These parameters are of very  general interest and 
importance in explaining many  decisions in addition to retirement, such as 
consumption and savings, insurance purchases, housing choices, and so forth. 
Moreover, the values of these parameters have crucial implications  for evaluat- 
ing both the positive and normative aspects of policy toward the elderly. 
My question is how seriously (or literally) we should take estimates of these 
parameters? For example, should I take estimates of  y = 1.8 for Air Force 
pilots as confirmation of my prior beliefs about this risk-loving bunch whom I 
should expect to see patronizing Las Vegas in large numbers? Should I take 
estimates of  y = 1.0 among the retirees of Firm 3 as evidence that they  are 
risk neutral? Or, alternatively, should I regard this as evidence that these em- 
ployees do not suffer diminishing marginal utility from concentrations of in- 
come in a given period because they are able to smooth their incomes through 
transactions in financial markets? What should I make of large differences in 
extra value of pension dollars to pilots, depending on whether their decisions 
are modeled with the option value or dynamic programming framework? Do 
men in Firm 3 value their leisure more than do women? A much more cautious 
view is that k,  p, and y are to be regarded as no more than parameters that 
provide enough flexibility of functional form to enable the model to fit the data. 
Stock and Wise (1990) discussed such questions in their initial presentation of 
the option value model and tended, at that time, to come down toward the 
cautious end of the interpretational  spectrum. Now that they and their collabo- 
rators have had more experience in estimating these models with different data 
sets and  in  both  dynamic programming and option value specifications, I 
would like to see them revisit these questions of whether the variations in in- 
centives provided by  pension programs provide natural experiments that can 
reveal underlying general behavioral parameters. 
In a similar vein, I would like to see the authors discuss the potential of 
applying these models to general data sets such as the new Health and Retire- 
ment Survey that contain data on individuals who face a wide variety of pen- 
sion plans, including no plans at all. Although I do not know this literature 
well, it appears that much of the excellent track record of the forward-looking 
models has been earned by predicting behavior of individuals who are all em- 114  Comment on Chapters 2 and 3 
ployees of a given firm. This is certainly true of both papers under discussion 
today, albeit the Air Force is a very large firm. When applied to one firm at a 
time, the models can be very useful management tools. For most questions of 
broad policy, however, one would like to have estimates of the impact on the 
retirement behavior of  broad population groups. I know from the record of 
previous conferences in this series that the ambitious efforts of John Rust to 
apply dynamic programming methods to the RHS data have been frustrated by 
computational difficulties. What I am wondering is whether the simpler and 
more approximate, but computationally feasible, methods pioneered by the au- 
thors of  these two papers can make a useful contribution when applied to 
broader populations. 
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